De Lacy Galens Concept of Continuity 355
Abstract
Galen of Pergamum developed a new notion of the vegetative soul as seated in the liver, in a synthetic appropriation of Platonic tripartition, Aristotelian hylomorphism, Hippocratic elemental theory and Hellenistic science. The traditional analogy between plant and human being receives a firmer grounding in Galen, making the model of the plant more prominent than ever in the discussion of the vegetative soul. While most of the particular functions of the vegetative soul in human beings are well-defined by Galen, its generative and formative powers remain unexplained, since the stuff to which we attribute these powers seems to lack intelligence.
Notes
- 1.
See Carpenter in this volume for a more complete view of the Timaeus.
- 2.
All abbreviations used for Galen's works are the standard ones, which can be found in Singer (2013).
- 3.
Socrates does actually speak of a division in forms (εἴδη) and parts (μέρη), but Galen does not consider this kind of division scientifically proven on the basis of Socrates' argument. See Brown (2012) 53 f. and Schiefsky (2012) 331 f. for further discussion of the tripartition in Plato's Republic and in Galen.
- 4.
In the Timaeus too, Galen does not consider this point proven scientifically, considering the status of its arguments merely 'plausible' or 'persuasive' (see Chiaradonna (2014) for Galen's use of this term), which is why one of the major aims of PHP is to prove, scientifically, that the soul has three separate parts located in brain, heart and liver respectively (see also Tieleman (2018)); cf. Prop. Plac. 8, 180,15 f. Boudon and Pietrobelli.
- 5.
Galen has a remarkably strong aversion to understanding man as a unity that comes to the fore in several ways and that perhaps lies at the basis of his consistent adherence to Plato's tripartition. In his commentary on the Hippocratic On the Nature of Man, he disqualifies the notion that 'man is one' as 'bizarre' (HNH 36 Mewaldt, XV 67 K)
- 6.
These systems of distribution are important, especially because one of the major problems with the Platonic notion of soul, according to Galen, is the question of its extension through the body, see, e.g. QAM IV 776 K: '… nor, indeed, do I discern how, not being any part of the body, it is able to extend through the whole of it.' (tr. Singer 2013, 382).
- 7.
The distinction between homoeomerous bodies and organs in this form goes back at least to Aristotle, for Galen it is basic doctrine, see, e.g., Opt. Med. I 60 K; QAM IV 773-74 K; HNH 6,11 f. Mewaldt (XV 7-8 K); Part. Hom. Diff. 51 Strohmaier; Hipp Elem 126 De Lacy (I 479-81K).
- 8.
'Vegetative' translating φυτικὸν, distinguished by Aristotle from the ἐπιθυμητικὸν in Nic. Eth. I, 13, 1102a32-b31, and said to be the cause of nutrition and growth, present in both embryos and full-grown animals.
- 9.
In some works, though not in PHP, Galen introduces the testicles as a fourth principle responsible for the function of reproduction (cf. Tieleman (2003) 159 f., including references in note 70); See Vegetti (2000), Schiefsky (2012) and Trompeter (2018) for discussion of the complex issue of the relation between desire and rationality in Galen.
- 10.
Cf. Foet. Form. 68,21 Nickel (V 665-6 K): 'As their soul is a single thing, of one type – for they have neither a spirited nor a rational part – there is some hope that we shall find the management of plants to be a pure unadulterated thing too.' (tr. Singer 1997, 183)
- 11.
Cf. PHP VI, 3, 382, 17 f. De Lacy, where Galen considers the vein connecting liver and stomach similar to the roots of plants, the stomach being like the earth, and the vein from the liver to the rest of the body as similar to the stem of plants. Thus, the liver itself is compared to that part of the plant from which both roots and stalk sprout, which Galen calls ῥίζωσις and which he considers to be the seat of the plant's soul; cf. Sem. 90,16 f. De Lacy (IV 539-40 K)
- 12.
cf. also V, 1, 779a1 f.: 'But on the other hand, if it is necessary that the animal should have sensation and if it is first an animal when it has acquired sensation, we ought to consider the original condition to be not sleep but only something resembling sleep, such a condition as we find also in plants, for indeed at this time animals do actually live the life of a plant.' (tr. Barnes 1984, 1204)
- 13.
Cf. also GA II 4, 740a24-b2: 'Since the embryo is already potentially an animal but an imperfect one, it must obtain its nourishment from elsewhere; accordingly it makes use of the uterus and the mother, as a plant does of the earth, to get nourishment, until it is perfected to the point of being now an animal potentially locomotive.' (tr. Barnes 1984, 1148)
- 14.
Cf. Kovacic (2001) 195: 'Der Embryo ist gerade noch Pflanze, die im Begriffe ist, Tier zu warden. Die Pflanze wirft nicht die Fähigkeit weg, die sie von Anfang an besitzt, sie bekommt vielmehr – im Übergang zum Tier – noch andere Fähigkeiten dazu: die Loslösung von der Gebärmutter und die örtliche Bewegung. Daher hat das Tier etwas Pflanzenhaftes in seiner Physiologie; die Pflanze ist wiederum nicht grundverschieden vom Tier, sie ist sogar sein Modell.'
- 15.
In Nat. Fac. Galen seems to adopt more of an Aristotelian perspective than in other works (esp. Sem.): he seems to simply accept the hylomorphic division into male seed as form and female blood as matter here. Partly, this may be due to the polemic with Erasistratus.
- 16.
Nat. Fac. II, 3, 85–6 K; the specific terms are: ἑλκτικήν τινα δύναμιν, ἡ ἀλλοιωττικὴ δύναμις, ἡ διαπλαστικὴ [δύναμις]; cf. in particular I, 5, 10 K for attribution of the latter two terms to nature as creator: 'Genesis, however, is not a simple activity of Nature, but is compounded of alteration and of shaping.', where the same hylomorphic metaphors are employed as well. The power of attraction is related to nature as a guardian of her creatures, that does not abandon them after creation, see, e.g., Nat. Fac. II, 3, 80 K; in Foet. Form. 62,14 f. Nickel (V 659 K f.), we find the same notion of the seed constructing the embryo, there also compared with the construction of trees; cf. also Sem. 90, 7–92,12 f. De Lacy (IV 539–41 K)
- 17.
Sem. 84,16 f. De Lacy (IV 534 K): 'As much of the semen, then, as touched the uterus immediately became membrane, as was shown a little earlier. But as for all the rest, it too, of course, had inborn powers, the power to attract what was congenial, the power by which it would retain and alter it and turn it into food for itself, and the power to expel what was alien and superfluous.' (tr. De Lacy 1992, 85); Nat. Fac. I, 12, II 28 K.
- 18.
Cf. Hipp. Elem. 128,11 De Lacy (I 482 K), where Galen says that the four elementary qualities 'alone, by altering the underlying substance, cause the elements to change into each other, and they are the artisans [δημιουργοί] of plants and animals.' (tr. De Lacy 1996, 129); there is, however, often a tension in Galen, between explaining things in terms of the elemental qualities or the mixtures they form on the one hand, and the intelligence of nature implied by the observed design of its individual beings on the other – see also the final quotation of this chapter (and see van der Eijk (2014) on this subject).
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Acknowledgments
The research for this chapter has been made possible by the Nederlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and falls within the project "Human Nature: Medical and Philosophical Perspectives in the Work of Galen of Pergamum" directed by prof. Teun Tieleman.
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Vinkesteijn, R. (2021). The Vegetative Soul in Galen. In: Baldassarri, F., Blank, A. (eds) Vegetative Powers. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 234. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69709-9_4
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